The Battle of Marshall:

The greatest little battle that was never fought

by James M. Denny
 Historian, Missouri Department of Natural Resources 

he Battle of Marshall was fought on Oct. 13, 1863. It is remembered as the culminating event of the famous raid into Missouri led by Col. Joseph O. Shelby. It was here that Union General. Egbert B. Brown and 1800 soldiers turned back the black plumbed warrior and his 1,200 horsemen in a day-long battle. Descriptions of this battle depict a hard fought affair with ferocious charges and determined defensive stands. The picture that emerges is that Shelby had a close call on that day. Union forces had managed to nearly encircle Shelby’s troops, and then, with a dashing charge, to split the Confederate force in half. But the wily Confederate commander and his divided column, in spirited charges, broke through the Union line in two places and made their separate ways back to Confederate Arkansas, hotly pursued all the way.

It is interesting to read the accounts of this battle because they present such widely varying depictions of what actually occurred on that fateful day when the Civil War descended on Marshall in a big way. But after all the smoke of that battle has long drifted away, we still remain in something of a fog about just what the Battle of Marshall was all about.

Col. Joseph O. Shelby

By the fall of 1863, Missouri and northern Arkansas as far south as Little Rock, were under Federal control. The Confederate army, temporarily commanded by Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, had been driven south of the Arkansas River. Col. Joseph O. Shelby chose this time to approach Price with a bold plan. Before the Civil War, Shelby had been a prosperous planter and hemp manufacturer at Waverly, along the Missouri River. Then the border warfare erupted and economic hard times followed on its heels, especially in the hemp industry. He got his start as a cavalry leader leading bands of men into free state Kansas. This skill must have run in his family, for John Hunt Morgan was both a kinsman and a kindred spirit. He fought Jayhawkers with conviction during the "Bleeding Kansas" period, and when the Civil War that had been raging on the border for five years finally engulfed the whole nation, he immediately raised and led a company of cavalrymen, and participated in most of the battles of the early months of the Civil War. Soon he was attracting favorable notice from his superiors as he turned in one outstanding performance after another in all the major conflicts of the Civil War’s Western Theater.

By the Fall of 1863 he had risen to the rank of Colonel, but seemed poised to become the top cavalryman in the West. The original claimant to that title, Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke, scion of one of the Boonslick’s great families, had achieved only mixed results from his two raids into Southern Missouri in January and April-May, 1863. Marmaduke had failed to gain sufficient intelligence about his enemy, had engaged in dangerous pitched battles that he failed to win, and his columns proved too large and too encumbered with supply wagons to move with the speed and mobility of a proper cavalry raid.

Shelby had been along on these raids and knew he could perform better. And the time was ripe to make his great move. With the year wearing on, the hour was growing late to produce some kind of triumph west of the Mississippi to complement the great Confederate victory at the Battle of Chickamauga, fought on Sept. 19–20, 1863. The victors followed up that triumph by besieging the loser, Union General William Rosecrans, at Chattanooga. Some kind of bold move west of the Mississippi could shore up the siege by making sure that Missouri soldiers were too busy in their own state to come to the aid of Rosecrans. Earlier that year, thousands of troops had been moved east from Missouri to assist in the Vicksburg campaign, but Shelby thought that this time around he could keep Missouri bluecoats too busy defending their own state to be spared for campaigns elsewhere.

Shelby had a plan for the most daring raid into Missouri that had been yet planned. Unlike Marmaduke’s Raids, this one would be leaner and meaner, strike deeper into Missouri’s heartland, and move with a rapidity that would leave Yankee pursuers confused and constantly eating Confederate dust. His force would consist of hand-picked, hard fighting Missourians who would like nothing more than to return to their beloved state. Their spirits would be high at the prospect of revisiting old neighborhoods and familiar haunts. Once in the state, Shelby proposed to launch a series of lightning strikes against unsuspecting Federal outposts. He told Price that such a raid would keep Missouri troops from leaving the state to reinforce Rosecrans. Equally important, his presence in Missouri’s heartland would rekindle the spirit of hope and resistance in the hearts of southern sympathizing Missourians living under the yoke of Federal rule. Along the way Shelby would also gather Confederate recruits. Shelby received Price’s approval to proceed and the promise of general’s star if he succeeded in his daring expedition.

Shelby’s Raid, began on September 22, 1863; on that day his battle-tested brigade, comprising 600 men, rode out of Arkadelphia, Arkansas. At Bentonville, Arkansas, Shelby’s column was increased by 200 men, under Col. D. C. Hunter; the next day, October 2, he crossed into Missouri where another 400 men, commanded by Col. John T. Coffee, fell in, swelling Shelby’s total force to 1,200 cavalrymen. On October 4, Shelby struck Neosho where he captured 180 Union militia, confiscated arms and equipment, and cannonaded the courthouse.

Before the capture of Neosho, Federal commanders in Southwest Missouri were ignorant of the fact that Shelby’s brigade was rampaging through southwest Missouri. At this time the Union military presence in Missouri consisted primarily of state militia units. Their units were small and widely dispersed. They performed garrison duty in towns, and spent much of their time chasing bands of guerrillas around the countryside.

Union commanders in southwest Missouri immediately began to alert officers to concentrate at several points as rapidly as possible and try to intercept the Confederate raiders. The surprised Federals moved too slowly, however, to close with the with Shelby’s swiftly moving horsemen who continued to gallop northward, eluding Federal forces, capturing or scattering militia garrisons, taking towns and leaving smoldering ruins of courthouses at Neosho, Greenfield and Stockton. It was not until the Raiders reached Warsaw on October 8^th,135 miles north of the border, that Shelby encountered even token opposition in the form of a company of militia cavalry that briefly blocked his way before being driven away with the forfeiture of their wagons and supplies.

Brig.Gen. Egbert E. Brown

By the time his riders reached Warsaw, Shelby was in the district of Brig. Gen. Egbert Brown. Ten months earlier, on January 8, 1863, Shelby had got the chance to take the measure of Brown at the Battle of Springfield. This was during Marmaduke’s first raid. With the Union Army of the Frontier still lingering in Arkansas following the Battle of Prairie Grove, Springfield was lightly defended and seemed an easy target for conquest. But Brown had summoned enough troops, including convalescents from the military hospital, to make a stand. Shelby’s regiments occupied the center in the battle where they hurled themselves against Brown’s makeshift defenders. In the course of the battle Brown received a shot that shattered his arm. When the battle ended at nightfall, Brown’s men still held their positions despite repeated charges by Marmaduke’s and Shelby’s veterans.

Now, as Shelby moved north, it was Brown’s turn to give chase and try to bring Shelby and his raiders to bay. Egbert Benson Brown had come to his general’s star in the Missouri State Militia by a circuitous route. He was born a New Yorker and had taken to sea on a whaling ship as a young man. Later he became a grain dealer in Ohio and eventually mayor of Toledo. In 1852, he moved to St. Louis and entered the railroad business. With the eruption of war, Brown inaugurated his military career as a Lt. Col. of the Seventh Missouri Infantry. When the Seventh was transferred to Tennessee, Brown stayed in Missouri and accepted a commission as Brig. Gen. of state militia, and it was as a commander of Missouri militia that Brown spent the remainder of his military career.

Brown’s first challenge was to find Shelby and get on his trail. In an initial effort to intercept Shelby, Brown moved from Clinton to Osceola with Col. John F. Phillips and 800 men of the Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry. At the same time he ordered Lt. Col. B. F. Lazear and 670 men of the First Regiment Missouri State Militia Cavalry to move east from their position at Clinton until they struck the trail of Shelby’s Raiders. But giving chase to a seasoned cavalry officer like Shelby was hardly an easy task for even experienced cavalry. Before it was all over, Brown’s troops would chase Shelby across 300 miles of thickly timbered country in a grueling three-day pursuit, carried out without forage, rations or camp equipage.

While Lazear and his men spurred after Shelby’s column, the raiders rode on in a northeast direction, from Warsaw through Cole Camp and Syracuse. By the morning of the 10^th, Shelby was at Tipton. While here, he set his men to work destroying tracks along a thirty-mile stretch of the Pacific Railroad. The night before, Shelby’s men burned the railroad bridge over the Lamine River at Otterville, and captured a small militia detachment. Late in the day, on the 10^th, Shelby moved his Raiders towards Boonville.

After a long chase, on Oct. 11, Lazear’s advance guard finally caught up with Shelby’s rear guard four miles south of Boonville and, in the fading light of day, skirmished with his pickets. Shelby’s men, meanwhile, rode triumphantly into Boonville that afternoon and cheered the sight of the Missouri River, nearly 350 air miles distant from where they had set out 19 days earlier. But despite the celebrations and the lavish local hospitality bestowed by the Southern leaning citizens of Boonville, Shelby slept fitfully that night. Like Brown, he had received a wound in the arm, his at the Battle of Helena, July 4, 1863, and it was troubling him that night. Besides, he knew that the Federals were closing in and that things would soon grow hot. He mistakenly though that Brown was advancing from Jefferson City, and that he had a huge force with him. Somewhere to his front was General Thomas Ewing with another huge army. Bright an early the next morning, his column was off, moving out on the Marshall road.

On the morning of Oct.12, Lazear discovered that Shelby had moved out of Boonville during the night, heading in the direction of Marshall, and he began an immediate pursuit. Shelby posted Maj. G. P. Gordon at Dug Ford on the Lamine River to ambush Lazear’s column. The Federals charged across the ford, and the concealed Confederates unleashed a deadly volley. Fifty Unionists fell at first fire, so said John Newman Edwards in Shelby’s report. Two killed, five wounded was the Federal count. The charging Federals soon cleared the enemy and Lazear continued the chase. Shortly, Gen. Brown came up with Phillips troops and took the advance. With the Federals pressing his rear guard, Shelby made another stand at Salt Fork Creek, near Jonesborough (today’s Napton). Edwards claims a furious charge that drove the enemy and left the ground littered with their dead. According to Federal accounts, the two sides stayed put and exchanged artillery fire until nightfall, with the loss of one cannoneer. Shelby moved out and halted within six miles of Marshall, while the Federals bivouacked on their arms at Salt Fork Creek.

Brown’s united force now numbered about 1,800 men, plus six pieces of artillery, while Shelby had 1,200 men plus, perhaps, 200 recruits that he had gathered on his way through Missouri, and two pieces of artillery, including a piece captured from General Brown at the Battle of Springfield.

As long as Shelby could keep ahead of his pursuers, he could indefinitely use the same strategy employed at Dug Ford of detaching a portion of his command to ambush his enemy and slow their advance, while his main force continued their forward movement. With his front clear, Shelby had little trouble getting forage, fresh mounts and abundant supplies for his men. Brown knew that he would have to get a portion of his command in front of Shelby if he hoped to compel the elusive cavalryman into decisive action. Such a Napoleonic maneuver violated the cardinal rule of warfare to never divide a force in the face of the enemy; it was risky and could lead to disaster, as happened to Lyon and Sigel at Wilson’s Creek, on August 10, 1861. Brown was willing to take the risk; it was the only way he could hope to accomplish what no other Union commander had succeeded in doing during Shelby’s Raid—make Shelby stand and fight.

To carry out his daring plan, Brown sent Lazear and his force, now swelled to 1,000 men, on a late night march around Shelby’s left flank to establish a position in front of the Confederate raiders, in the town of Marshall. Brown would wait till daybreak and then follow Shelby’s route of march till he came upon the rear of Shelby’s army. Shelby would then be trapped between two attacking forces. It might be possible to capture their entire force, and, if not that, to do severe damage to the raiders, scatter their units, and set them in a headlong flight back to their distant lines.

The initial phase of the plan worked to perfection. Lazear’s command was in Marshall by sunrise on the morning of Oct. 13, and within an hour his pickets on the Arrow Rock road (today’s Eastwood Street) rode up with the report that Shelby’s Confederates were advancing in force.

Shelby rapidly forded Salt Fork Creek (just north of this location) and posted the regiment of Maj. David Shanks at the crossing to delay Brown’s column while he continued on with the remainder of his force to face the Union troops to his front. During this opening phase of the battle, Shelby and his enemy were evenly matched, but the commander evidently did not realize this. Unless the Confederate estimate of the opposing Union forces was intentionally exaggerated to make it seem as if the heroic black plumed warrior was vastly outnumbered at 8 to 1, Shelby claimed to believe he was facing the 4,000-man strong force of Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing, who he assumed had moved his large force east from Sedalia to attack the raiders from the front while Brown, with what Shelby claimed were another 4,000 men, moved on his rear. According to his own reports (authored, of course, by John Newman Edwards), Shelby was undaunted by such huge numbers of Federals, and seemed determined to attack and defeat Ewing to his front before Brown could fall on his rear.

While Shelby advanced towards his position, Lazear started to place his troops in line on the east side of Marshall. He sent Maj. G. W. Kelly forward with the Fourth Missouri State Militia to slow Shelby long enough to establish his defensive position. He placed his two pieces of artillery in the center behind Maj. A. W. Mullins and three companies of the First Missouri State Militia Cavalry. He established his right on a hill southeast of Marshall. Here, he posted the Second Battalion, First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, commanded by Maj. J. H. McGhee, and Capt. W. D. Wear’s company, the Ninth Provisional Regiment Missouri State Militia Cavalry. On the Union left, he positioned Maj. William Gentry’s battalion of the Fifth Provisional Regiment Missouri Enrolled Militia.

Upon making contact with the advance guard under Kelly, Shelby halted, dismounted his men and arrayed them in line of battle. Lt. Col. J. C. Hooper’s regiment formed the left while the center was composed of the regiment of Capt. G. P. Gordon and the battalion of Maj. Benjamin Elliot, and the right was made up of the regiments of Cols. D. C. Hunter and J. T. Coffee. Kelly, in the meanwhile, his mission fulfilled, retired to the rear of the Federal center to form a reserve force.

Shelby now began to probe the Federal line for signs of weakness. First, he sent Hooper’s regiment against McGhee’s position on the Federal right. The battlefield was cut by a series of deep and brushy ravines that ran down to Salt Fork Creek, and one of these ravines lay between Hooper and McGhee. To get at the Federals, Hooper’s men had to charge across this ravine into heavy rifle fire from McGhee’s troops. This proved too much and Hooper fell back. Next, Shelby unleashed Elliot and Gordon against the Federal center held by Mullins. Mullins’ soldiers proved equal to the task and withstood three "desperate" charges. The Federal artillery was advanced to within 250 yards of the enemy. At this point Hunter and Coffee launched a furious charge against the Federal left in an effort to capture the two Federal cannon. This sector of the battlefield was defended by Gentry’s citizen soldiers. Here was a weak spot. The green militiamen fell back in the face of this charge without firing a shot. The artillery was quickly pulled back and Gentry’s men were rallied at the edge of town and held their position against several more charges. Major Kelly’s battalion was moved to the left of Gentry to shore up the Federal left and prevent a Confederate flanking movement.

By then the battle had been raging for a hour and a half or more, and Lazear’s position had held fast against repeated Confederate charges. Lazear described the battle from his perspective: "The enemy fired at us about a shot every two minutes with their Artillery for four hours and only killed two horses. Besides they made a number of charges on different parts of our line but our riflemen would lay flat on the ground until they would get in good range when they would raise up and let them have it and the rebels would run like turkies to rally and try it in another place." According to Edwards, "For two hours the fight raged evenly along the entire line, and the sun came out and looked down upon the dying and the dead, and the green fields of Missouri drank the blood of her best and bravest." Whose blood was being drunk by those thirsty fields is not at all clear. Lazear’s men were well sheltered and fighting from the prone position. Their casualties amounted to none killed, seven wounded. No one knows for sure what the toll, if any, was for Shelby, but his casualties were probably light, as well.

At this time, Lazear’s men heard the boom of Federal artillery and knew that the forces of Gen. Brown had come up at last and were attacking the Confederate rear, held by Shanks’ regiment. Gen. Brown sent the battalion of Maj. T. W. Houts, backed by two sections of artillery, against Shanks’ position on the west side of the bridge over Salt Fork Creek, while Capt. Foster was sent a half a mile north of the crossing, followed by Majors Suess and Foster and two pieces of artillery. They battled Shanks for an hour. At the same time, Brown moved Phillips three-quarters of a mile south around the southern flank of the Confederate position to attack the Confederate left. They found it rough going through the ravines and tangled brush, but Phillips did manage to dismount his men and get them moving forward to attack Shelby’s left flank, which was still beyond rifle range. As his men advanced, Phillips saw the Confederates making preparations to withdraw. He then remounted his men and circled around to take up a position on the left of Gentry and Kelly to prevent a Confederate breakout.

While the Federals moved around his position, Shanks attempted to withdraw toward the main body of Shelby’s troops, fighting Houts all the way. Edwards swelled Houts three companies into an entire massive army: ". . .Brown was hurling his strong columns upon the heroic and devoted Shanks, and must bear him back. For two mortal hours Shanks, with his 200 men, held Brown’s 4,000 in check. . ." At the same time, Shelby was in the process of mounting his force and preparing to break through the Union left and escape to the northwest in the direction of his hometown, Waverly. All these preparations consumed a considerable amount of time. Shelby had moved into tangled brushy country, punctuated by ravines. In order to save his train of ammunition and supplies, he had to construct a temporary bridge across a ravine and this took time. While this was going on, Phillips was remounting his force and galloping to a new position on Shelby’s right flank. An hour or more was consumed in these actions.

The climatic moment of the Battle of Marshall had arrived. The chroniclers would have us to believe that this moment was full of the drama of courageous charges and hairsbreadth escapes. Shelby was in a tight fix, if we are to believe Edwards. He was squeezed between Ewing’s and Brown’s gigantic armies with their twelve pieces of artillery (six actually) blazing away. "As soon as my command were mounted and straightened out," he has Shelby say, " I saw the Federals were almost entirely around me, and only on the right was there a way open for escape, and this every minute getting narrower and narrower. . .Now gathering my command well in hand, I dashed furiously at the enemy’s left. . .Hard blows were given and received. The Federals gave way in terror before the momentary shock, and Gordon, Coffee, the battalion, and the wagons passed safely through. . ."

While Shelby was shaping his great moment of daring escape, the Federal’s great moment came, as well, in the form of Kelly’s Charge. The strange thing is that Kelly, in his after action report makes no mention of this, his greatest military moment, but all other Union accounts bring it up as one of the battle’s culminating moments.

What happened was that, as Shelby was departing to the northwest, Maj. Kelly led his batallion of the Fourth Missouri State Militia Cavalry in a charge through Shelby’s lines and found himself interposed between Shanks, Hunter and Hooper on one flank and the rest of Shelby’s retreating command on the other moving away. Kelly broke the enemy center, according to Phillips. Lazear stated that Kelly ". . .made his gallant charge, cutting the enemy’s lines in two and scattering his forces." This almost sounds like a small-scale Chickamauga in reverse—a brilliant maneuver leading to a glorious victory. In actuality, Kelly did not break the Confederate center, nor did he cut their lines in two and scatter their forces. The Confederate lines were already separated when Shelby launched his breakout. Shanks did not have time to rejoin Shelby, and Hooper’s and part of Hunter’s, regiments were cut off as well. According to the History of Saline County, Kelly had but to clear some 20 of Gordon’s troops to achieve his ‘breakthrough."

By the time of Kelly’s charge Shelby was already escaping to the northwest. Brown did to some extent manage to encircle Shelby’s force before this happened, but, drawing on the History of Saline County again, Brown’s line was a thin one consisting of musket bearing militiamen placed at six foot intervals. This depiction is at considerable variance with that of Edwards’ florid account of the breakout, provided in Shelby and His Men: "Look where one would, the prairie was dark with uniforms and bristling with glittering steel." The Union hoard poured in by regiments, Edwards continued, "fraternizing and shouting like devils." Shelby determined that he must break out , "even if it required the sacrifice of half the brigade." Finally, when he could wait no longer for Shanks, he personally led the desperate charge: "The thin gray wedge dashed down full upon the enemy’s line, receiving the fire of three full batteries, but killing the skirmishers behind the corn-shocks in dozens." Finally, according to Edwards, the Union foe dissolved: "A few first fell away from the flanks panic-striken; the regiment then quivered and shook from end to end, until heaving and collapsing to an impulse as swift and vivid as the lightning’s flash, it broke away toward Marshall, hopelessly rent and scattered."

In other words, Shelby had little trouble scattering the handful of Union soldiers in his front and riding through the line with no loss on either side. Shelby, with the commands of Elliot, Coffee, and Gordon, along with his trains of ammunition and captured Federal goods, moved north toward Miami. During the breakout, Shelby did lose one of his two pieces of artillery to Brown, bringing the score to one captured cannon apiece for the respective one-armed commanders.

Shanks, Hunter and Hooper, meanwhile, swung off to the right, crossed Salt Fork Creek and retreated down the Arrow Rock Road (today’s Highway 41) and then struck out south. Phillips pursued Shelby’s force for the rest of the day while Lazear moved west to intercept Shelby when he turned south, and Houts chased after Hunter, Hooper and Shanks.

Anyone who studies this curious battle comes away with the impression that there were two Battles of Marshall. There is the one that emerges from the reports and accounts of protagonists of both sides, and we have seen the descriptions of desperate fighting, daring charges, and corpse-strewn battlefields. This battle seems to be almost entirely imaginary. The real affair turned out to be two forces going through the motions of a battle without actually fighting one. Modern-day reenactments of this battle might well produce more casualties than the real one did. Nobody on the Union side got killed, and probably not more than four or five on the Confederate side. Terrain and weaponry no doubt played a role. The History of Saline County puts it well: "[Shelby’s] men were well sheltered, as were the Federals, by timber and ravines, and firing was mere pastime; it was not at all dangerous; lead enough was thrown to kill and maim a division, but the protection afforded by nature, the inaccuracy of the Federal fire, being mostly delivered from muskets, and the distance of the Confederates from their foes, prevented any very great slaughter, for which we may all now be very thankful." This description is seconded by George T. Maddox, one of Shelby’s Raiders, who actually participated in the battle: "The ground was so situated that it seemed to give us all the advantage. There was a ravine every fifty or sixty yards, and brush about as high as a man’s head . . . We were so scattered they could scarcely see any body to shoot at."

There is also the question of just how badly the respective commanders wanted to fight each other that day. If Shelby truly did think he was facing Ewing, then he was operating on faulty intelligence, and failed to realize that he was facing, not four thousand men, but only one thousand men, a force that could be fought on equal terms. As he would be throwing experienced regulars against less experienced militia, he had an advantage he might of exploited to gain a victory. But no matter who Shelby might have thought he was facing, as a raider, his job was not to bring on pitched battles but keep moving and avoid capture. Despite Edwards assertions that Shelby was eager for a fight, the opposite is probably true. A fight was probably the last thing he wanted. In later life, Shelby was reported (by a Unionist) to have said: "Boys, it was Missourian against Missourian and man to man in that fight, and we were d___d badly whipped, and the less said about it by us, the better." He had made a mistake by letting his enemy get in his front and rear, and he nearly got himself surrounded. He was, indeed, d____d lucky to have escaped with as little loss as he incurred."

The Federal forces could and did congratulate themselves heartily on having broken up Shelby’s Raid. One participant on the Federal side, George S. Grover, proudly proclaimed: "In seven days we were concentrated, marched over 300 miles, without forage, rations, or camp equipage, three days and nights in rain and mud, and in that time we killed and wounded a large number of the enemy, captured about 100 prisoners, one piece of artillery, all of his wagon train, small arms and ammunition; and our skirmishing and fighting extended over 100 miles of thickly wooded country. If it had been in Virginia or Tennessee it would have been called one of the great campaigns of the civil war, and thus passed into history." While Brown’s men did start Shelby on his way back to Arkansas, Grover certainly claims too much by comparing their operation with what commanders like Grant, Sheridan and Sherman were doing in Tennessee and Virginia. They were doing more than just scattering and herding the enemy. They were closing with their foes and fighting horrendous battles that produced a staggering slaughter. They were fighting the desperate and bloody battles that were deciding the outcome of the Civil War.

Brown and his militia, by contrast, were just keeping the lid on in seething Missouri. If they could prove their worth as soldiers and cope with the guerrillas and the raiders, regular troops would not have to be called back to Missouri to deal with a major enemy threat to Federal control. At Marshall, and in the days before and after, Brown’s militia proved they were game and they pressed Shelby hard.

Yet, there is clearly a sense that at Marshall, Brown let a rare opportunity slip away. The author of the History of Saline County accuses Brown of timidity, a charge frequently leveled at Brown. Brown may have thought that Shelby had more troops than he did, and that is perhaps why he did not pitch into Shelby’s rear with his full force. That was the moment and the opportunity he had created for himself when he sent Lazear to get into Shelby’s front. But instead of attacking with his full force, he diverted around Shelby and joined Lazear. Here he hesitated as if he was slow in comprehending the situation, according to the History of Saline County. He was slow to launch an assault and by the time he did it was too late. The crafty Shelby was gone. In a letter to his wife, Lazear grumbled: "They [Shelby and his raiders] ought to have been captured and if other forces had used half the exertion that we did there would not have been any of them got away. But I suppose Brig. Generals did not like to act on the suggestion of a Lt. Col. And therefore all the good that might have come out of the information I gave them and the suggestions was lost to the country. General Brown & General Ewing could have headed them at Booneville if they had acted on my suggestions. Ewing was in hearing of the fight but turned and went the other way."

Various Union forces pressed the two columns of Shelby’s raiders hard as they retreated toward Arkansas. The raiders were forced to destroy their train of captured goods. Back in Arkansas, near Bentonville, the two columns reunited and on. 3, 1863, the exhausted men of Shelby’s Raiders rode into Washington, Ark., and halted, at last.

Shelby had conducted a textbook raid, and one of the longest raids, at 1,500 miles (his claim), of the Civil War for either side, prior to Price’s Raid of the following year. Shelby’s reputation as the best cavalry leader in the Trans-Mississippi West, and one of the top cavalrymen of the Confederacy, was indelibly established. The saying became: "You’ve heard of Jeb Stuart’s Ride around McClellan? Hell, brother, Jo Shelby rode around MISSOURI!" Shelby’s superiors recognized his merit and the boost to Confederate morale produced by the raid by promoting him to brigadier general. Shelby and his men had reason to be pleased. The size of their force had been doubled, and they had captured or destroyed great quantities of Federal property, and scattered or captured local Federal garrisons. Shelby’s raid, however, made no lasting impact on the military situation in Missouri. When Shelby left the state, Federal authorities quickly recovered from this temporary disruption.

Gen. Brown, too, could be pleased. He had faced the redoubtable Shelby twice in 1863 and emerged victorious both times—a claim few other Union generals who tangled with Shelby could make. His Missouri militiamen had faced down the battle-hardened troops of one of the South’s most formidable warriors and sent them retreating southward, their forces split and their captured Federal property strewn in their wake. He might have done more, but he had achieved quite a lot. The lid was still on in Missouri, at least until the fighting season kicked up again the following Spring.

Brown’s Fabian ways finally caught up with him at the Battle of Westport. It was on the second day of the battle and Marmaduke and Pleasanton faced each other across Big Blue Creek. Curtis was pressing Price, and if Pleasanton could break Marmaduke’s lines, Price would be squeezed between attacking armies on his front and flank. Brown was to lead the Union assault across the Big Blue at Byram’s Ford. But with his great moment at hand, he hesitated one time too many. Pleasanton relieved him of command on the spot and placed him under arrest. His opportunity and command passed on to John F. Phillips, who led the successful charge across Byram’s Ford and went on take his share of glory in the great Union victory of that day and the day that followed.

On that last day of that battle, Price’s battered and defeated army was able to limp away only because of a heroic rear guard stand by none other than Jo Shelby. Pleasanton, who had sacked Brown the previous day, said without reservation: "Shelby was the best cavalry general of the South."

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