Dream Into Nightmare: 
Bishop Polk’s Missouri Strategy

Unfortunately for the South, a flawed command system, and the pettiness and stubbornness of generals who refused to put aside personal differences, dictated that the winning Missouri for the Confederacy was truly a lost cause.

By Jim McGhee, MMCWRT^*

he state of Missouri was a prize much desired by both the Union and Confederate governments at the beginning of hostilities in 1861. It appears from the existing evidence that President Abraham Lincoln wanted the state more than President Jefferson Davis, but some Missourians, the Blair family and Attorney General Edward Bates in particular, had great influence with Lincoln, while Davis tended to find most Missourians more irritating than anything else early on.

Regardless, one need only look at the 1860 Federal census data to understand why Missouri, and its most valuable assets, were so coveted. Robert L. Kerby, author of Kirby Smith’s Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South, 1863-1865, did so and he described Missouri as the "garden" of the area, for the reason that the state produced more tobacco, wool, hemp, wheat, rye, corn and oats, and supported more mines, and had more miles of railroad track than the rest of the Trans-Mississippi states combined. Missouri also raised more horses and swine than either Texas or Arkansas, while only Texas cattle and Louisiana mules outnumbered Missouri livestock. In nearly every category, including industrial production, mining, agricultural productivity, and in population Missouri had no peer west of the Mississippi. Thus Missouri was indeed a prize worth contending for by North and South.

This monograph is not intended to recount the early political and military events in Missouri in 1861. Most students of the war are doubtless familiar with the political machinations employed by secessionist Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson to take the state out of the Union, the pro-Union stance of the state convention, the bloody Camp Jackson Affair, and the blitzkreig campaign of General Nathaniel Lyon that forced Jackson’s government into exile, and pushed the main force of the pro-southern Missouri State Guard into the extreme southwest corner of the state to a makeshift encampment on Cowskin Prairie. Indeed, by early summer the fate of Missouri seemed to be sealed as both political and military events played out mostly in favor of the Union.

Of course, Governor Jackson and his supporters did not see things in that light. He was convinced that Missourians desired to align with the south, despite of all of the evidence to the contrary, and sought military assistance from the Confederacy to accomplish that goal. He was strongly seconded in his views by Major General Sterling Price, the commander of the Missouri State Guard. While the number of men who responded to the governor’s call to "drive the invaders" from Missouri fell far short of the 50,000 summoned, troops were busily organizing throughout the state that summer, and Jackson and Price were convinced that a drive to the Missouri River Valley would increase the state army to such size as to wrest the state from Union control. In the meantime, however, they desperately needed Confederate assistance.

Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont

As July waned the military situation in Missouri was essentially fluid. Major General John Charles Fremont assumed command of affairs in the Department of the West on July 25. A vain and pompous man, Fremont had earned a reputation as the "Pathfinder of the West" during his army career, and had been the first Republican nominee for president. He enhanced his position in public affairs by marrying the daughter of the prominent and politically powerful Thomas Hart Benton. Thrust into a position that greatly exceeded his abilities when made department commander, events would prove more than once that Fremont was not a distinguished soldier by any measure. Although several mid-western states were sending troops to Missouri with dispatch at the time, Union military assets in the state were limited when Fremont arrived on the scene. Primary Union army dispositions found General Nathaniel Lyon occupying Springfield with a small and dwindling army determined to destroy Price’s state force. General John Pope had five regiments north of the Missouri River trying to subdue growing pro-Confederate sentiment in that area. Small contingents held on to the railheads at Rolla and Pilot Knob, and another garrisoned Cape Girardeau. The largest troop complement under Fremont’s control was divided between Cairo, Illinois and Bird’s Point, Missouri where eight regiments guarded the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. In St. Louis, his headquarters, Fremont could count only about 4,000 soldiers.

Despite the rather limited number of troops available to him, and the serious trouble brewing in Missouri, Fremont elected to concentrate on larger things. He believed, and rightly so, that control of the Mississippi River was an important key to winning the war for the Union. His eyes were fixed on that proposition with gun-barrel vision, and his primary efforts were therefore devoted to implementing that strategy. Fremont’s fixation on the Mississippi River would have unforeseen consequences in the days to come.

While Fremont planned his grand descent of the Mississippi River in St. Louis, he seemingly ignored some threatening developments along his immediate front. His opponents were not entirely without plans or capabilities. The most ambitious plan of all, a most grandiose plan in retrospect, was developed by Fremont’s counterpart in the west, Major General Leonidas Polk, who had been trusted with the defense of the Mississippi River with headquarters at Memphis.

Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk

Leonidas Polk was a peculiar choice to hold such a responsible position in the nascent Confederate Army. Although he had graduated eighth of thirty-eight in the West Point class of 1827, where he roomed with Albert Sidney Johnston, Polk’s military career was brief prior to the Civil War, for six months after graduation he resigned his commission to study for the Episcopal ministry. He rose steadily in the Episcopal Church hierarchy until 1841 when he became the Bishop of Louisiana. While visiting Louisiana troops in Virginia in June, Polk was offered the Mississippi River defense position by another old schoolmate and friend, President Jefferson Davis. Although initially reluctant to enter the army, he accepted a commission and assumed command at Memphis on July 13, merely twelve days before Fremont arrived in St. Louis.

Oddly enough, and the point is all-important, Polk’s command authority did not extend west of the Mississippi River. Confederate troops in Arkansas, and in Louisiana and Texas as well, were under independent commanders. Since Arkansas bordered Missouri the troops in that state were obviously the most salient to Polk’s plan for warfare in Missouri. But because he did not command those troops, he could only make suggestions and recommendations as to what should be done. It was an organizational failure of great significance that would soon be rectified, but the change in the command structure was entirely too late to salvage Polk’s proposed campaign into Missouri in late July 1861.

The genesis of an invasion of Missouri actually preceded Polk’s arrival in Memphis. There is some evidence that suggests the plan was hatched in mid-June when General Gideon Pillow, then commanding all Tennessee state troops, and M. Jeff Thompson, a Missourian in search of a command, discussed such an operation at the Gayoso House, a popular local hostelry. Be that as it may, soon after taking over in Memphis, Polk looked north and saw, or thought he saw at least, an opportunity to help the Confederate cause in Missouri. He believed that the time was ripe to strike a blow in that state. Fuel was added to Polk’s ambitious idea when Governor Jackson arrived in Memphis with "intelligence" on the number of troops deployed along the Arkansas-Missouri border, and the large number of potential soldiers in Missouri that only awaited a Confederate coming. The numbers related by Jackson stoked Polk’s enthusiasm to a boiling point, and he quickly outlined his proposal for a Missouri campaign in a letter to Leroy P. Walker, Confederate secretary of war, on July 23.

Relying entirely on Jackson’s information, Polk averred that Confederate and Arkansas state troops commanded by Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch, and General Sterling Price’s Missouri State Guard jointly numbered 25,000 in or near southwest Missouri. He expected they would attack and defeat General Lyon’s force at Springfield, or at least drive it in the direction of Rolla. In the meantime, he intended to dispatch Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow to New Madrid, in extreme southeast Missouri, ahead of 6,000 troops, which he planned to bolster by two regiments, increasing Pillow’s numbers to 8,000. Once in Missouri Brigadier General M. Jeff Thompson, now commanding Missouri militia, and his 3,000 State Guardsmen would join him. These united forces would advance on Ironton, a lightly defended post some 80 miles south of St. Louis, and en route would be reinforced by approximately 7,000 Confederates and Missouri Guardsmen under Brigadier General William H. Hardee, stationed at Pocahontas just south of the Missouri border. The Pillow-Hardee-Thompson triumvirate would continue its advance to the rear of Lyon’s retreat, or, proceed to St. Louis, seize it and then advance up the Missouri River raising recruits as they proceeded. If St. Louis became the primary target then at such point as deemed "most suitable" a force would be detached to cut off Lyon’s expected retreat from the west and eventually join up with McCulloch, Price, and company. Having conquered Missouri, Polk’s combined armies, estimated by him to exceed 43,000 men, plus a multitude of recruits gathered in Missouri, would then cross over into Illinois and take Cairo from the rear! That, in a nutshell, was Polk’s most extraordinary dream. Almost immediately the dream turned into a nightmare of major proportions. .

	Polk's Plan for winning Missouri for the Confederacy.  (Click to Enlarge)

Indeed, within a matter of only five days Polk received new information as to the number of soldiers available for a Missouri campaign. Colonel Henry Little, adjutant to General Price, arrived in Memphis while en route to Richmond, and reported that Price and McCulloch together could muster only about 12,000 men, not all of them under arms. A letter from received from General Hardee about the same time revealed that he counted 2,300 men rather than the 7,000 credited to his command by Governor Jackson. In short, Polk learned two things to his utter dismay (1.) that the troops available for his purported coup de main in Missouri totaled about half the number he had anticipated; and (2.) that perhaps in the future he should not rely on a politician for military intelligence.

The dramatic news obviously changed the true military situation very greatly. Consequently, Polk's grand plan was placed on hold temporarily, as he realized he could hardly execute the original full-fledged invasion he envisioned. Therefore, Polk decided that he would fortify New Madrid as a base of operations, and would move forward "as circumstances would allow." Polk nevertheless remained firm in his original conviction that "now is the time to operate in Missouri." His plan would not be abandoned, but only delayed. He soon discovered, however, that more than troop shortages presented problems for his vision of furthering the Confederate cause in Missouri. The independent commanders stationed along the Arkansas-Missouri border, whose cooperation was absolutely essential to the success of Polk’s plan, turned out to be much more independent than Polk could ever have imagined.

Over on the western end of the line the Confederate units from Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas answered to Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch. A native of Tennessee, he had fought in the Texas War of Independence and the War with Mexico. He was a legend in Texas and had achieved some national notoriety as well. McCulloch was headstrong, not a person given to compromise. He possessed a high regard of his own military abilities, even though he had never commanded anything larger than a company of Texas Rangers. The Confederate troops under McCulloch, and a contingent of the Arkansas State Guard led by Brigadier General Bart Pearce, had the primary responsibility of guarding the northwest frontier of Arkansas and the Indian Territory. McCulloch reported directly to Richmond for orders. When called upon by the Missourians to assist them in dealing with General Nathaniel Lyon and his "Army of the West," McCulloch first hesitated as he had dubious authority to enter Missouri, still a part of the Union. But recognizing the obvious fact that the defense of Arkansas might best be fought in Missouri, McCulloch finally decided to cross the state border with his five thousand men to lend the Missourians under Sterling Price a needed hand.

Major General Sterling Price, a native Virginian who had long resided in Missouri, commanded the Missouri State Guard, the legal militia of the state, and answered only to Governor Jackson. Realistically, however, Jackson was most generally absent from the army attempting to drum up support and supplies, and Price operated as independently, or even more so, than McCulloch. A former state legislator, congressman, and governor, it has been said that Price was the most popular man in Missouri, and, according to President Davis, the most vain as well. He served in the Mexican War as a brigadier, but his record in that conflict demonstrated serious shortcomings, including a propensity for lax discipline, little regard for logistics, and a tendency to disregard orders from higher authority. Despite these negatives, Price successfully built an army out of practically nothing in a short period of time in 1861. He inspired great devotion among the Guardsmen, and they always fought extremely well for him. He commanded perhaps seven or eight thousand troops at the time, although they were poorly trained, armed and equipped, and a goodly number, maybe as many as 2,000, had no weapons whatsoever.

	In Southwestern Missouri, Arkansas/Louisiana/Texas state troops commanded by Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch, and General Sterling Price’s Missouri State Guard jointly numbered 12,000. Polk expected these troops would attack and defeat General Nathaniel Lyon’s "Army of the West" at Springfield, or at least drive it in the direction of Rolla.

Since General Polk had no authority over McCulloch or Price, he left them to their own devices. Things started out poorly between the Texan and Missourian almost immediately. For reasons that remain largely a mystery, McCulloch formed a negative opinion of Price after their initial meeting. That negativity, which soon took on a life of its own, would cloud the relationship between the two men for the next several months. Despite their differences, or maybe because of them, Price yielded overall command of the combined army to McCulloch, apparently in return for the latter agreeing to proceed against Lyon’s army. Consequently, McCulloch’s joint force soon moved into southwest Missouri intent on dealing with the Federals at Springfield. By August 9 the Southern forces were encamped some 10 miles south of Springfield on Wilson’s Creek.

Things in the eastern part of the state, in the "Bootheel" region, started with great promise. On July 28, 1861, Brigadier General Gideon Pillow arrived at New Madrid ahead of 6,000 men, grandly styled the "Army of Liberation," and was greeted with great enthusiasm by the local populace. He immediately reported his arrival in Missouri to General Polk and announced his army ready for the "Dutch hunt." With the hindsight of several decades, the inclusion of Gideon Pillow in Polk’s plan most likely spelled its doom from the very beginning. A political general in both the Mexican and Civil wars, Pillow was an egotistical, self-seeking individual, who was stubborn, argumentative, and even insubordinate with his superiors, and Polk would not be spared Pillow’s bad behavior. Bad blood already existed between the two generals, for Pillow felt slighted when Polk had been given command at Memphis, as he believed he deserved the position. He was also peeved because his rank was only brigadier general when he had been a major general in the Mexican War. But Pillow was normally an aggressive leader, who craved military fame and glory, and he believed that he saw the chance for both in Missouri. Perhaps that ambition would result in something positive; only events would tell.

	In Southeastern Missouri, Polk expected the combined forces of Generals Pillow-Hardee-Thompson to continue their advance on St. Louis and if the Federals under General Lyon were not defeated at Springfield then a force would be detached to cut off Lyon’s expected retreat from the west and eventually join up with McCulloch and Price. Having conquered Missouri, Polk’s combined armies, estimated by him to exceed 43,000 men, plus a multitude of recruits gathered in Missouri, would then cross over into Illinois and take Cairo from the rear!

Meanwhile, Brigadier General William J. Hardee, the other Confederate commander near southeast Missouri, was encamped at Pitman’s Ferry, Arkansas, barely south of the Missouri line, with perhaps 3,000 soldiers, including some Missouri State Guardsmen. Hardee was a polished professional soldier of the old army. He graduated from West Point in the class of 1838. Seeing service in the Seminole and Mexican wars, he later was commandant of cadets at West Point and authored a standard manual on tactics. He was a military perfectionist. At the time, however, Hardee demonstrated an uncharacteristic reluctance to cooperate in a military advance. For example, when Sterling Price sought his assistance in moving against Lyon, Hardee declined to help, citing the poor condition of his troops and a lack of transportation. One can only surmise Price’s reaction to Hardee’s excuse when he gazed upon his own rag-tag army. Eventually, Hardee did move a portion of his troops north to Greenville in Wayne County, Missouri, and there he made his camp, and there for the most part he stayed.

The third role player in the planned operation in southeast Missouri was General M. Jeff Thompson. He commanded the 1^st Division of the Missouri State Guard, perhaps three thousand poorly armed troops. One of the true characters of the war, Thompson was always energetic, endlessly enthusiastic, and perpetually ready for a fight. Although his only prior military experience had been in the pre-war militia, he seemed to possess an innate understanding of cavalry operations and partisan tactics. Like Sterling Price, his most fervent desire was to liberate Missouri from, as he put it, the "Tories and Hessians." Thompson could hardly wait for the campaign to get underway, and he was indifferent to the part his troops would play so long as they got to "smell some powder." "I will work in any part of the harness," he proclaimed, "so don’t tie me behind the wagon."

According to Polk’s original plan, as noted, these three forces were to unite near Ironton, and the campaign to win Missouri for the Confederacy would then proceed. Unfortunately for Polk, and the Missourians, and for their mutual dream of driving the Yankees from the state, Hardee and Pillow almost immediately began to work at cross-purposes. Each, at one time or another, wrote Polk demanding more transportation, more supplies, and troops before they could move, while precious days passed when they might have actually accomplished something positive for their cause.

Unfortunately, Polk’s plan had largely ignored the peculiar topography of southeast Missouri. Pillow’s and Hardee’s commands were separated by a vast swamp and overflow area that stretched from just south of Cape Girardeau through the rest of the Bootheel into Arkansas and that greatly hindered east-west travel. Pillow decided that he could best join Hardee by first eliminating the garrison at Cape Girardeau and thus avoid the swamp in that manner. On the other hand, Hardee insisted that Pillow could unite with him by crossing the swamp lower down on a plank road. The two generals simply could never agree on a plan of action. While Pillow demanded Hardee’s support in taking Cape Girardeau before moving on Ironton, Hardee insisted on a direct approach to Ironton by the combined forces from his position. Polk, whose command authority ended at the Mississippi River, refused to decisively intervene in the dispute, although he could control Pillow’s "Army of Liberation," and neither Pillow nor Hardee would voluntarily submit to the other’s ideas or plans. Thus Polk’s vaunted campaign into southeast Missouri, and beyond, soon bogged down in a morass of unmatched stubbornness and a woefully inadequate system of command.

Thompson’s troops played the unenviable role of middlemen in the on-going quarrel between Pillow and Hardee. Always anxious to take the offensive, Thompson journeyed to New Madrid, where a conference with General Pillow and Governor Jackson determined that he should march his troops to Hardee’s assistance immediately. Riding hard back to Bloomfield, the Missourian set his units into motion on August 5 and actually marched them several miles toward Hardee’s camp, only to be unexpectedly ordered back to support General Pillow’s advance on Cape Girardeau two days later. Somewhat confused by this development, but still enthusiastic, Thompson about faced his command and made a laborious night march through the forbidding Mingo Swamp to higher ground in Stoddard County. After a brief respite, the Missourians made their way through the great East Swamp to Jones’ Ferry along the Stoddard-Scott county line. The men hardly had time to dry out from their arduous trek when a courier dashed into camp with the frustrating report that Pillow had evacuated New Madrid and with orders directing the Guardsmen to proceed on to Hardee’s assistance as originally scheduled. Completely bewildered at this point, General Thompson wisely decided to stay put with his troops until the situation cleared. In fact the situation never really cleared, for neither Pillow nor Hardee ever made a serious advance northward during the entire month of August.

Undoubtedly the lack of cooperation between Pillow and Hardee was costly for the secessionist cause in Missouri. Credible evidence, including the opinion of Ulysses S. Grant, who was there, suggests that an attack on the small Ironton garrison would have succeeded at that particular time, opening the way to St. Louis or central Missouri when the Confederates possessed the strategic initiative. Perhaps an overall Confederate commander in southeast Missouri in 1861, endowed with the clear authority to direct the three separate armies, could have achieved success.

Ironically, the mere presence of the three armies in southeast Missouri had an important, although perhaps unintended, strategic effect in a different part of the state. Local Federal commanders at Cairo and Cape Girardeau vastly overestimated the rebel forces threatening their front and each consequently bombarded department headquarters at St. Louis for reinforcements. At the same time, General Lyon’s small "Army of the West" in fact faced a numerically superior enemy combination, McCulloch and Price, near Springfield. He also sent numerous urgent pleas to General Fremont begging for additional troops. Deeming the threat in southeast Missouri more critical to his projected plan to descend the Mississippi River and divide the Confederacy, Fremont chose to send his limited reserves to Cairo, Cape Girardeau and Bird’s Point. Without the needed reinforcements, Lyon was subsequently repulsed in a bloody action at Wilson’s Creek on August 10 that sent his army scurrying in retreat to Rolla.

The defeat of Lyon opened all of western Missouri to enemy invasion and cost the Federals the strategic initiative in that vast area. Had Polk’s plan in southeast Missouri been carried out, the remnant of Lyon’s army might well have been destroyed at or near Rolla, and a united Confederate/State Guard army, including the troops of McCulloch, Price, Hardee, Pillow and Thompson, would have gained the upper hand in the state at large. That combination could have seriously threatened St. Louis, which, as Jeff Thompson noted early on, was the "heart of the battle" in the state.

But of course, that did not happen. Following the hard won victory at Wilson’s Creek, the Southern troops marched into Springfield. McCulloch, perhaps not realizing he was in a Union stronghold in the state, glanced about and announced that there was about as much Southern feeling there as in Boston. And he, and his primary lieutenant, James McIntosh, continued to castigate the leadership of the Missouri State Guard, averring that there was "not a soldier among them," which further alienated the Missouri commanders and their troops. Shortly thereafter Price, recognizing the urgency of doing something in Missouri to follow up their victory, prodded McCulloch to accompany the Missouri State Guard to the Missouri River Valley. McCulloch, however, refused; he later claimed that he declined to advance with Price because his primary duty was to protect Arkansas and the Indian Territory, a lack of ammunition, and because he could expect no cooperation from Hardee or Pillow. Soon he and his men returned to northwest Arkansas, while Price and his army marched north to a different destiny at Lexington.

After frittering away the opportunity presented in mid-summer, the Confederate desire to assist Missouri in "going South" dissipated altogether. In early September Confederate efforts in the west turned from Missouri to Kentucky following Polk’s decision to end the latter state’s proclaimed neutrality by occupying Columbus. Pillow’s command moved to Columbus, and not long afterwards Hardee left Arkansas for Bowling Green. Consequently, by early fall, 1861, the only Confederate troops in Missouri were relatively small detachments at Belmont and New Madrid in the Bootheel, and they were not about to assume any offensive operations.

Thus, in slightly over a month Polk’s grand campaign in Missouri had transfigured from bright hope to abject failure. The Missouri State Guard was left to fend for itself, and it simply did not possess the power or numbers to accomplish much alone. There would never again be Confederate troops contending for Missouri, at least on Missouri soil, except for those poor souls involved in the botched defense of New Madrid in the spring of 1862, and the cavalry raiders of Price, Marmaduke and Shelby in 1863 and 1864.

Bishop Polk’s strategy for Missouri in 1861 was obviously flawed; it was based on faulty intelligence, and doubtless overly optimistic in its projected results. Despite its shortcomings, however, it was in reality the only plan ever put forth by any Confederate authority to win the state for the Confederacy early in the war. Could the plan have succeeded? In all likelihood the answer is no. But who can say with certainty now what the implications, political and military, might have been if a victorious Confederate army of even 25,000 troops had been marching on St. Louis in the close aftermath of First Manassas.

The evidence suggests that if the Confederacy ever had any real hope of doing anything in Missouri it was in late July and early August of 1861. Circumstances never again presented a similar opportunity during the remainder of the war. Unfortunately for the South, a flawed command system, and the pettiness and stubbornness of generals who refused to put aside personal differences, dictated that winning Missouri for the Confederacy was truly a lost cause.

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